THE ICC AND NON-PARTY STATES: CONSISTENCY AND
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Chimène I. Keitner*
I thought I would begin with the observation that this conference is called
The International Criminal Court and the Community of Nations, and so each
of our conversations today has been structured around a different “community.” When it comes to non-party states, however, I am hard pressed to conceptualize them as forming a community per se. One would expect members
of a community to share certain attributes, including at least some sort of
shared values or understandings. Nonetheless, as we heard from Diane Amann
this morning, there is a refrain that we hear from many of the non-party states.
It is a refrain of emphasis on sovereignty, and a distinction between the sovereigntist values of these non-party states and the idea of “global governance”
embodied by international institutions and by the International Criminal Court
(ICC)—or so the dichotomy is presented.1 To the extent there is a community
at work, perhaps the glue among these disparate states is at least a rhetorical
emphasis on sovereignty and a tacit or even explicit assumption that sovereignty is inherently in tension with the treaty mechanisms that were created in
Rome in 1998. In my remarks, I will talk about the who of this community,
the what of their complaints about the ICC, and the why that animates these
complaints.
It is fairly straightforward to identify the who. As you all know, at the
Rome Conference in 1998, 120 states voted to adopt the treaty.2 Seven states
voted against the treaty, and although it was an anonymous vote, those states
have subsequently been identified as China, Iraq, Israel, Qatar, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and the United States.3 The main objection articulated by the United
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States at the time, as you will recall, was a fairly narrow and specific objection: namely, that the treaty structure adopted by these 120 states contains
jurisdictional provisions that enable the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over individuals who are nationals of states that have yet to ratify the Rome Statute.4
Contrary to misrepresentations in popular media, and even statements by
some current U.S. officials, the ICC does not purport to exercise an unlimited
universal jurisdiction.5 However, if crimes that fall within the subject matter
jurisdiction and the temporal jurisdiction of the court are alleged to have been
committed on the territory of a state party to the Rome Statute, then individuals implicated in those crimes, who may be nationals of non-party states, also
fall within the enumerated categories of jurisdiction under the statute.6 This
possibility has always been the consistent objection of the United States to the
structure of the Rome Statute and to the purported jurisdictional reach of the
court that it created.7 In addition, if a situation is referred to the ICC by the
UN Security Council, the fact that a state whose nationals are implicated by
the referral has not ratified the Rome Statute will not be a barrier to the ICC
exercising its jurisdiction under the terms of the Rome Statute.8
Notwithstanding this objection, as you all know, the administration of
President Bill Clinton affixed the signature of the United States to the Rome
Statute at the very last opportunity.9 Although the United States is not a party
to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), Article 18 of that
convention indicates that a signatory to a treaty—not necessarily a party, but
a signatory—is obliged not to take any steps to undermine the object and purpose of that treaty.10 If you are a party to the VCLT, or if you think that Article
18 has some customary international law valence, then you might be concerned about the status of the United States as a signatory. This is not a position the Bush administration, which followed the Clinton administration, was
satisfied with, to say the least.11 In 2001, Senator Jesse Helms gave a speech
at the American Enterprise Institute that I quoted in a 2001 article about the
ICC and article 98(2).12 Just to give you a flavor—this is back in the very
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beginning, before the court even existed, before the statute had been ratified
by the required 60 states—Jesse Helms said:
[f]irst, the Bush Administration should simply un-sign the
Rome Statute. I mean, quite literally, that the Administration
should instruct someone at the U.S. Mission in New York to
walk across the street to the UN, ask to see the treaty document, and then take out a pen and draw a line through Ambassador Scheffer’s name. I think that will send a clear message.13
Well, as all of you know, the United States is reported to have “un-signed”
the treaty. In concrete terms, the United States purported to do this by sending
a letter, indicating the United States did not intend to ratify the statute and
therefore did not consider itself to be bound by any obligation under Article
18 to act consistent with, or not to undermine, the statute.14 As you may also
recall, that letter, which was sent in 2002, was perhaps somewhat unusually
signed not by the Ambassador to the United Nations, but by the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, coincidentally a
gentleman by the name of John Bolton.15
Since that 2002 letter from the United States, a number of other signatories
to the Rome Statute have also deposited letters indicating they do not intend
to become parties and therefore do not consider themselves bound in any way
by their signatures.16 These signatories include Israel in 2002,17 Sudan in
2008,18 and Russia in 2016.19 There are other states that have indicated that
they intend to, or have in fact, deposited instruments withdrawing from the
Rome Statute or purporting to do so.20 Burundi and the Philippines, as we
13
Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Towards a
Compassionate Conservative Foreign Policy, Address at the American Enterprise Institute
(Jan. 11, 2001).
14
Keitner, supra note 12.
15
Letter from John R. Bolton, Sec’y of State for Arms Control and Int’l Sec., to Kofi
Annan, UN Sec’y Gen. (May 6, 2002) (available at https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps
/2002/9968.htm).
16
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
17
Declaration of Israel (Aug. 22, 2002), https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.as
px?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-10&chapter=18&lang=en#4.
18
Declaration of Sudan (Aug. 26, 2008), https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.asp
x?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-10&chapter=18&lang=en#10.
19
Declaration of the Russian Federation (Nov. 30, 2016), https://treaties.un.org/pages
/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-10&chapter=18&lang=en#9.
20
For a table demonstrating the notification of withdrawals deposited by South Africa,
Burundi, Gambia, and the Philippines, see Rome Statute, supra note 16, n.2, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-10&chapter=18&

632

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 47:629

heard this morning, have done that, as have South Africa and Gambia—although these latter two states subsequently deposited a further notification
withdrawing their withdrawal.21 That is where we stand with respect to the
community of non-party states, along with the states that never signed or ratified the Rome Statute to begin with. That is the who.
I already talked a little bit about the what. The United States’ main complaint is the purported exercise of jurisdiction over nationals of non-party
states under the terms of the statute.22 Earlier today, we heard a video message
from the ICC prosecutor. I found it interesting that in the catalog of situations
that are either being investigated, or that the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP)
has made the subject of a preliminary examination, the vast majority of the
non-African situations involve acts by nationals of non-party states. There are
seven such examinations or investigations, two of which have been concluded
by the OTP without a decision to move forward with further action.23 These
are cataloged in a paper by Yaël Ronen from Hebrew University entitled The
ICC and Nationals of Non-Party States.24 It is interesting to note that this understandable desire to be more geographically inclusive in the work of the
OTP seems to entail—and I would suggest not inevitably—a focus on situations where the question of asserting jurisdiction over nationals of non-party
states has become an issue that is front and center. This may exacerbate the
backlash in rhetoric and actions that we have seen in certain countries.
I will move on to my last question, the why. Why is this objectionable?
Why do countries object to the exercise of jurisdiction by an international
court over their nationals when most of these countries would accept that, by
virtue of the territorial principle of jurisdiction, the states on whose territory
the conduct occurred would be able to assert criminal jurisdiction themselves,
absent some sort of status or forces agreement or other consensual arrangement? I think the purest expression of the ideological opposition to the court
came recently in a September 2018 speech by John Bolton, now National Security Advisor to the President, in remarks to the Federalist Society, and in a
speech by President Trump to the General Assembly of the United Nations.25
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The overarching ideological opposition articulated in those two public statements was between what the President referred to as an “ideology of patriotism” and what he characterized as an “ideology of globalism.”26 This vocabulary has been attributed to one of the President’s advisors and speech writers,
Stephen Miller,27 and the language also echoes the rhetoric in a 1990 article
written by John Bolton and published in the Chicago Journal of International
Law entitled “Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?”.28 Now I think
if we take a step back, one answer to the challenge posed by this ideology of
patriotism is that, as you all know, the ICC exercises complementary jurisdiction to that of nation-states, rather than the primary jurisdiction assigned to
the ad hoc international criminal tribunals.29 However, in a December 2017
statement to the Assembly of States Parties, the U.S. representative indicated
this was also objectionable, because the ICC itself determines whether or not
a nation-state has in fact conducted the requisite investigation and, if necessary, prosecution needed to prevent a case from going forward in the ICC.30
The U.S. representative also indicated the United States rejects the ICC’s authority to review the adequacy of domestic accountability mechanisms of a
non-party state absent the consent of that state or Security Council authorization.31
I would like to end my remarks on perhaps a slightly more positive note.
The group of non-party states cannot all be tarred with the same brush. Notwithstanding the fairly alarmist, and one might even say incendiary, rhetoric
of late, the United States has consistently articulated support for accountability alongside objections to specific accountability mechanisms. For example,
if you look at the December 2017 statement that the United States made at the
Assembly of States Parties,32 or the way the OTP is proceeding in the Afghanistan situation from the broader pursuit of accountability for international
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crimes,33 you can see a very conscious effort to separate jurisdictional objections to the ICC. Now I do think, given the current posture of the United
States, the profession of support for an emphasis on accountability does ring
a bit hollow, especially because we have come to associate the ICC with the
international justice project more generally. There is a tendency to perceive
opposition to one as opposition to both, and support for one as support for
both. But I do think it is important to distinguish between them.
The footnote that I will add to my remarks is an interesting statement that
the State Department Deputy Spokesperson issued on March 5, 2019, supporting Germany’s request that Lebanon extradite a Syrian general accused of
crimes against humanity.34 The State Department indicated that the United
States “would welcome any decision by the government of Lebanon that
would facilitate the lawful extradition of Syrian General Jamil Hassan to Germany.”35 Hassan faces charges in Germany for crimes against humanity for
the extensive use of torture in Syrian detention centers, and he has already
been the subject of sanctions by both the United States and the European Union.
In conclusion, in my 2001 article I suggested that in developing the rules
of procedure and evidence for the ICC, the Assembly of States Parties should
not attempt to seek consensus at the expense of consistency with uniform values, applied uniformly.36 With a bit of hindsight, and given today’s political
situation, it might well be worth focusing on areas where we can develop consensus—even perhaps at the expense of a certain degree of consistency—so
that we can move accountability efforts forward in the best way possible.
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